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REGENT GASES
(1) that prompt action will be taken on all applications for occupational
licenses;
(2) that only in cases where there is a real and immediate danger to
public health or welfare, will any administrative agency revoke or
suspend any license except after hearing;
(3) to insure a right of judicial review in proper cases;
(4) to require that a different section of the administrative agency rule
on the evidence, than that section which secures information against
the licensee in any revocation or suspension proceeding;
(5) to provide that no license issued to businesses of a continuing na-
ture shall expire until determination has been made of any timely
application for renewal;
(6) to require the various administrative commissions to establish uli-
forn procedures and make and publish their rules.
WILLS-DIVORCE AS AFFECTING A PREVIOUSLY
EXECUTED WILL
The average person gaining freedom from matrinonial difficulties
gives too little thought to certain lingering effects of the dissolved
marital felationship. Considerable difficulty has arisen in the Courts as
to whether or not divorce revokes the provisions of a pre-existing will as
concerns the ex spouse.
This question to date has not been authoritatively settled in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court in a recent caset had an opportunity to
pass upon that point but declined affirmatively to do so, ruling instead
upon another ground. However, it is believed that by necessary impli-
cation Florida now holds that divorce standing alone will not revoke
a pre-existing will.
On appeal by the divorced wife for construction of the will, the
Court determined that it Was the intent of the testator, as gleaned from
the four corners of the instrument, that the bequest to the wife was
onditioned upon her surviving him as wife. The portion of the will
which strongly influenced the Court in determining the testator's in1tenl-
tion was; "Unto my beloved wife, Pauline lies, in case she survivs
me, and not otherwise, I give, devise, ;ind bequeath, etc." In addition
the Court enphasized the fact that shotild the first bequest lapse, the
gift would go to his lawful issue, and if this too failed, then to the
testator's brother. From the above the Court concluded it was clearly
the testator's intention to provide for only those. who had a legal or
moral claim to his estate, and since at his death the testator had neither
wife nor bodily issue, the estate therefore passed to the testator's brother.
In this interpretation of the testator's intent, the Court ruled contrary
to the weight of authority.2 The majority rule is that when the words,
I Iles v. Iles ......... Fla .......... 29 So. (2d) 21 (1946).
2 Lavender v. Roseheim, 110 Md. 150, 72 Atl. 669 (1909); In re
Jones, 211 Pa. St. 364, 60 At]. 915 (1905); Bell v. Smelly, 45 N. J.
Eq. 478, 18 At. 70 (1889); 27 Ohio St. 299, 22 Am. Rep. 387 (1875);
Murphy v. Markie, 98 N. J. Eq. 153, 130 Atl. 840 (1920). In re Simp-
son's Will, 280 N. Y. S. 705, 155 Misc. 866 (1935).
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"beloved wife," plus the individual's naime are used in a will, such words
are merely descriptio personae and the wife takes as name beneficiary
despite a prior divorce. There are dicta in the Florida case of Kuchm-
sted v. Hewitt 3 to that effect. In the Kuchmsted case, the heirs of the
deceased testatrix sought to invalidate a marriage upon the ground of
lack of mental capacity of the testatrix and thus to defeat the provisions
of a will leaving the lion's share of the decedent's estate to the husband.
The Court ruled that the marriage was void ab initio, but went on to
say that as the testatrix had left the estate to her husband, Hewett, that
the defendant Hewitt took under the will despite the void marriage,
since he was a name beneficiary and the word "husband" was merely
descriptio personae.
As for the Court's solution of the problem of the Iles case upon the
basis of the testator's intent, it is suggested that in such a situation the
test of intention is a poor one. The average person executes a will in-
tending to provide for his wife as his helpmeet and of that time there
is surely no thought of the possibility of divorce. Certainly a divorce
may work a subsequent change iii this intention, but the fact remains
that the testator's intention at the time of drawing the will is controlling.
It would seem that the effect of divorce upon a previously executed will
should be determined solely upon principles of implied revocation, unless
the will specifically provides fot such a contingency.
Passing to the question of the effect of divorce alone upon a pre-
existing will and as to whether or not this is an implied revocation due
to the changed circumstances of the testator, the authorities are not in
accord. The great weight of authority is that there is no revocation by
the mere fact of divorce, 4 but there is some authority contra.5
The cases illustrating the majority rule 6 base their conclusions upon
various theories to the effect that the person named as legatee did not
die in the lifetime of the testator, nor did any event occur in the lifetime
of the testator which under the language of the will would render the
testamentary gift inoperative. The donee is alive, and has both capacity
and willingness to take under the will ; the words beloved wife, etc.,
are not conditional or words ofli iimitatioii, but merely descriptive; and
3 103 Fla. 1177, 138 So. 778 (1932).
4 Re Brown, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N. W. 260 (1908); Pacetti v. Rowlin-
ski, 169 Ga. 602, 150 So. 910 (1929); In re Nenaber's Estate, 55 S. D.
257, 225 N. W. 719 (1929); Cord v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492, 40 Am.
Rep. 187 (1881); Cunningham's Succession, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 502
(1918); Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 69 N. W. 303 (1896); Jones
Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 69 L. R. A. 940 (1905). In re Brannon's Estate,
111 Cal. App. 38, 295 P. 83 (1931).
S Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219 (1905); Battis
v. Montana, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N. W. 9 (1910); Bartlet v. Lahr, 108
Neb. 681, 190 N. W. 869 (1922); Martin v. Martin, 109 Neb. 289, 190
N. W. 872 (1922); Re McGraws Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 199 N. W. 686
(1924).
6 Note 4, 8upra.
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since the testator has not by some affirmative act revoked the will
clearly, his intention was not to do so.
The minority cases, as typified by McGraws Estate7, reach a contrary
conclusion in the identical situation upon the theory that in an ordinary
divorce proceeding there is much ill will and rancour. Some courts
admit that where there are infant children the result might be different.
A few courts hold by divorce the wife becomes a stranger and that the
estate should be maintained within the testator's family. Other courts
hold that the common law rule was that divorce was an implied revoca-
tion of a previously executed will, but the argument is specious since
the common law courts until the latter part of the nineteenth century
had no jurisdiction over divorce, jurisdiction being vested in the Eccles-
iastical courts.
It is of interest to note that the majority of Courts agree that when
there is a property settlement, divorce does revoke a pre-existing will8
upon the theory that such things represent a change in the testator's
circumstances which makes the doctrine of implied revocation applicable.
Certainly, it is more rational to assume that where the decedent has
made a property settlement, his intention, were he alive to express it,
would be to revoke the provisions in his will concerning his ex-spouse.
In the Iles case, 9 although appellant's counsel raised the question of
whether divorce alone revoked a pre-existing will, the Court stated that
there was no authority in Florida upon this matter and proceeded to base
the decision solely upon the testator's intention. However, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the Court's premise must have been that divorce
alone will not revoke a pre-existing will and therefore we must turn to
the instrument itself to determine what was the testator's intention.
Despite the ingenuity of judicial reasoning upon this question, it seems
that the better solution would be for the Legislature to enact a statute
definitely stating what the rule in this state shall be. Mr. Redfearn has
advocated10 such a step. Pennsylvania by a recent statute' 1 has declared
that divorce will revoke all provisions in a pre-existing will in favor of
the former spouse, while Minnesota and Washington have had similar
statutes for some time.
7 228 Mich. 1, 199 N. W. 686 (1924).
8 Re Crane, Cal, 57 P. 2d 47 (1936); Gartin v. Gartin, 296 Ill. App.
330, 16 N. E. 2d 184 (1938); Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W.
699 (1893); Pardee v. Grubiss, 34 Ohio App. 474, 171 N. E. 375 (1929);
Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 52 P. 2d 1219 (1935) (annulment with
property settlement); Wirth v. Wirth, 149 Mich. 687, 113 N. W. 306
(1907); Donaldsnn v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219 (1909);
Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 898 N. W. 390 (1922).
9 Note 1, supra.
10 Redfearn, "Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida", (2d
Ed., 1946), p. 136.
I Wills Act of April 24, 1947, see. 7 (2).
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